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 Trade Blocs, Interstate Conflict, and the     
Collective Impact of Economic Integration 
 
 
 
Matthew Shaffer  University of South Carolina 
 
Abstract 
Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or regional trade 
agreements – have dramatically expanded in scope since World War II.  While the proximate 
goal of economic integration is to increase commercial exchange between member states, there 
are strong reasons to believe integration influences relations across economic agreements as 
well.  I argue that economic agreements foster enclaves of regional interdependence at the 
expense of multilateral, global interdependence.  As a result, highly central economic agreements 
are partially insulated from the ill-effects of militarized conflict with other agreement areas.  
Furthermore, the coveted markets of highly central trade blocs afford them a degree of economic 
leverage that increases the effectiveness of non-violent conflict resolution mechanisms.  
Ultimately, these dynamics suggest highly central agreements will tend to engage in conflict with 
other central agreements due to the mutual isolation of said agreements.  Relations between 
central and marginalized agreements, however, will be more peaceful given the latter’s 
dependence on access to central agreement markets.  Using eigenvector centrality scores as my 
primary measure of agreement centrality, I test my theory using a large-N statistical analysis.  I 
ultimately find support for the notion that dyads with more central agreements are more conflict 
prone other types of dyads.   
Economic integration agreements – also called preferential trade agreements or regional 
trade agreements – are cornerstones of commercial policy for states today in every region of the 
world.  By lowering commercial barriers, agreements increase trade and investment between 
member states.  As a consequence, the number of extant agreements now numbers close to three-
hundred unique arrangements with many more in various stages of negotiation.  The proliferation 
of agreements is accompanied by increasing complexity.  Many economic agreements now 
incorporate external trade policy harmonization and factor mobility in addition to standard trade 
liberalization.  In addition to increasing commercial exchange, states also gain from agreements 
by increasing their bargaining power in multilateral negotiations and signaling political 
commitment to particular policies.  Furthermore, rhetoric from scholars and politicians alike 
suggests that commercial integration is as valuable for peace and security as it is for economic 
prosperity.  French minister Robert Schuman, when advocating for the European Coal and Steel 
Community, firmly believed in economic cooperation as a means to peace:  
“By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions 
will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the 
realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the 
preservation of peace.” (Schuman 1950) 
While the effects of economic agreements on member states are general positive, giving 
credence to policymaker’s claims, the aggregate welfare effect of their proliferation is a source 
of debate.  On one hand, economic agreements may serve as springboards to greater multilateral 
openness and improve global economic efficiency.  Regional integration affords states the 
opportunity to work through trade issues with fewer players complicating the dynamic.  On the 
other, they may dampen individual states’ zeal for additional liberalization or simply fail to 
create meaningful gains in efficiency.  If member states prefer the sanctuary of the trade 
agreement to increase competition from external states, this is likely the case.  Furthermore, trade 
agreements may simply divert trade from extra-agreement to intra-agreement sources without 
improving economic efficiency.  Consequently, while agreements may foster greater global 
interdependence, they may also limit or even sever it in certain circumstances.   
In this paper, I consider whether the proliferation of economic agreements and their 
potential impact on global interdependence influences interstate conflict.  A broader literature in 
political science finds that interdependence tends to discourage conflict through various 
mechanisms.  If economic agreements act as vehicles or obstacles of interdependence, though, 
we might expect them to influence the aggregate behavior of their member states.  I specifically 
argue that economic agreements create enclaves of interdependence that substitute regional for 
global connectedness.  While this may promote peace within the agreement itself, it likely sparks 
inter-agreement conflict if member states are central members of the global trading network.  
Hence, while economic agreements may promote the welfare and security of states within the 
agreement, they may sacrifice extra-agreement security with ambiguous overall implications.  
My research, therefore, provides important insight into the political ramifications of economic 
agreements as one of the most dynamic trends in international relations.   
In the sections that follow, I lay out my argument and empirically test it using a large-N 
study.  The next section briefly surveys the existing literature on economic interdependence and 
interstate conflict.  Following this, I present my theory arguing that economic agreements restrict 
or sever global interdependence, thereby encouraging inter-agreement conflict.  I then offer 
empirical assessment of my theory using statistical analysis.  Ultimately, I find that agreements 
comprised of highly central states are more likely to engage in conflict with each other than with 
less central states.  I conclude with some policy implications and avenues of future research. 
 
Economic Integration and Interdependence        
Economic integration agreement, as I use the term, refers to institutions removing barriers 
to commercial exchange.  In general, this is broadly similar to the conventional use of regional 
trade agreements.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) defines a regional trade agreement as a 
territory that maintains separate tariffs or regulations for a “substantial part of the trade of such 
territory” (WTO 1947, Article XXIV).  This definition distinguishes regional economic 
agreements from more universal arrangements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
or the WTO in that, first, it liberalizes beyond WTO standards and, second, membership is 
restricted.  Through this paper I use the terms economic agreement, trade bloc, and regional trade 
agreement interchangeably, as they refer to the same basic entity. 
Economic integration agreements typically offer substantial commercial advantages for 
member states.  By reducing the barriers to commerce, goods and services flow more freely 
between member states owing to lower overall transaction costs.  The potential gains from 
removing obstacles increase as the scope and depth of activities covered in agreements expands.  
Indeed, a robust body of literature exists in economics and political science details the 
ramifications of commercial integration.  First, agreements tend to increase trade between 
member states due to reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers (Baier and Bergstrang 2007; 
Carrere 2006).  Second, the convergence of intra-agreement trade policy resulting from lowering 
barriers implicitly broadens the markets of member states.  This is analogous to an exogenous 
increase in the size of domestic markets.  Larger markets created by economic agreements may 
increase foreign direct investment into member states as corporations look to exploit newly 
realized economics of scale (Joumotte 2004).  Finally, agreements are often “sticky” or difficult 
to rescind without suffering consequences from members states and domestic and international 
markets in general.  In this way commercial agreements act as constraints on decision-makers 
and bind domestic policies to more open, liberal orientations (Whalley 1996).  Accession to an 
agreement is therefore a signal of specific policy intentions (Fernandez and Portes 1998; Schiff 
and Winters 1998).   
Overall, as a result of these mechanisms, economic agreements foster interdependence 
between member states in ways that are thought to reduce conflict between members.  Stemming 
from Immanuel Kant, who believed economic interdependence reinforced legal systems and 
socialized states to prefer cooperation rather than conflict (1991 [1795]), may have argued the 
pacifying effects of interdependence.  The most developed branch of this argument holds that 
trade between nations confers tangible, material gains that provide incentives to avoid conflict.  
In short, benefits accrue to states engaged in trade through the mutual exchange of goods.  War 
puts at risk these commercial ties and chances the long-term prosperity of the relationship.  Trade 
therefore reduces conflict through opportunity costs insomuch as trade is disrupted by war 
(Polachek 1992; Russett and Oneal 1997; 1999a; 1999b; 2001 for confirmatory evidence; See 
Barbieri 1996, 2002 for contrasting conclusions).  Additionally, more in line with Kant’s original 
thoughts, trade may pacify states through a socialization process that encourages the acquisition 
of resources through exchange rather than conquest (Keohane and Nye 1977; Rosecrance 1986; 
Hegre 2000).  Somewhat underdeveloped as a mechanism is the possibility that economic 
interdependence increases the effectiveness of alternative conflict resolution mechanisms (Stein 
2003).  In other words, policies short of war may be substituted to achieve foreign policy goals.  
For example, economic sanctions may be used to selectively harm the economy of another state 
if interdependence is sufficiently high (Baldwin 1985, 189-195; Baldwin 1993; Whalley 1996; 
Mastanduno 2003, 176; Morrow 2003, 91).  War is therefore unnecessary between 
interdependent states.  For their part, the literature specifically addressing economic agreements 
finds they too encourage peace by reinforcing interdependence (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000; 
Bearce 2003; Bearce and Omari 2005; Haftel 2007).   
Economic integration does not exist in a vacuum, however.  Agreements can profoundly 
affect the global trading landscape by altering commercial dynamics between states.  On one 
hand, agreements may simply divert trade from non-members to members without actually 
increasing aggregate trade flows.  This process was first identified by Viner (1950).  In short, 
goods are shifted from lower- to higher-cost producers due exclusively to the selective removal 
of trade restrictions (Viner 1950; Krugman 1991; 1999; Findlay and Panagariya 1994; Pomfret 
2001).  Empirically, numerous studies either using gravity models to predict baseline levels of 
trade or case studies identify trade diversion across several trade agreements (see Schiff and 
Winters 2003, 190 for a review, as well as Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1995; Eichengreen and 
Frankel 1995; Baldwin, Forslid, and Haaland 1996; Yeats 1997; Gupta and Schiff 1997; Chang 
and Winters 2002; Magee 2008).  Consequently, trade agreements may create or perpetuate 
economic distortions rather than foster efficiency. 
Perhaps more importantly, however, are the broader political implications of economic 
integration.  Trade agreements can also incentivize protectionism among agreement members 
vis-à-vis the external world.  Depending on the agreement type, barriers between members and 
non-members may actually increase once agreements are signed (Viner 1950).  Indeed, Krugman 
(1989; 1991; 1993) and Schiff and Winters (1998) show formally that agreement members have 
strong incentives to raise external barriers and generate trade diversion as a welfare-maximizing 
strategy and means to improve their terms of trade.  Regional agreements may also be hindering 
multilateral trade liberalization and thereby limiting global interdependence.  Indeed, the larger 
the RTA, the more inward looking it may become, and conclude that the additional members or 
further liberalization will not benefit the group significantly (Bhagwati and Panagariya 1999; 
Krugman 1999).  Krugman (1991) demonstrates formally the relationship between agreement 
size and demand for liberalization.  The optimal strategy of relatively large agreements is to limit 
exposure to the external world, thereby maximizing internal gains.  Newly minted economic 
agreements may therefore pursue more aggressive trade policies in an effort to leverage 
aggregate market power.  Indeed, the subdued role of the European Community in 1982 
multilateral trade negotiations may have reflected contentment with the progression of internal 
trade agreements to date.
1
  Likewise, many economic agreements in the 1980s and early 1990s 
were specifically created to counter Japanese economic influence (Bergsten 1991).   
Finally, despite the fact that it is bad economic theory, trade diversion may be good 
politics.  Constituencies within agreement members that benefit from trade diversion have strong 
incentives to maintain and accelerate the process (Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998).  This effect is 
most pronounced within agreements where states possess similar factor endowments (Levy 
1997).  As an example, Brazil lobbied heavily for the inclusion of extensive information 
technology trade liberalization in MERCOSUR negotiations, but subsequently opposed a similar 
potential multilateral agreement (Schiff and Winters 2003, 72).   
While extant political science research has focused on the intra-agreement influence of 
economic integration, a robust economics literature suggests their potentially effects on extra-
agreement dynamics are equally profound.  If trade blocs are indeed substitutes for far-reaching, 
multilateral economic liberalization, then the pacifying effects of interdependence may be 
limited or severed.  In the next section, I consider the possible influence of integration on 
interstate conflict at the agreement level.    
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Trade Blocs and Interstate Conflict         
Regional economic agreements, in many ways, are substitutes for broad, multilateral 
liberalization.  Insofar as international trade is characterized (by policymakers, at least) as a 
prisoner’s dilemma, states desire agreements to ensure reciprocal trade concessions.  When 
global agreements – like those under the auspices of the World Trade Organization – are not 
feasible or slow to mature, states often seek arrangements with proximate or important trade 
partners.  Often times, as a robust literature in economics indicates, multilateral liberalization is 
less likely as a result.  Consequently, states entering into regional economic agreements purchase 
regional at the expense of multilateral interdependence.  This process affects conflict behavior by 
reducing the salience of extra-agreement commercial ties and lowering the relative cost of 
conflict between trade blocs.  Not all agreements are equal, however.  Highly central agreements 
comprised of important trading states are likely the most affected by this process.  Marginalized 
agreements with peripheral states, in contrast, are still dependent in the global trading system.  
Consequently, central agreements are more conflict prone than others.   
Reduced Salience of Inter-agreement Commercial Ties       
 As noted, economic agreements tend to promote commercial exchange by reducing 
barriers between member states.  As a result, the salience of economic relationships between 
agreement members increases.  Trade is the most basic type of relationship changed by economic 
integration.  As tariffs, quotas, and regulations within agreements fall, the total amount of 
bilateral trade between members likely increases as states realize comparative advantages, 
economies of scale, and increased efficiency from production (Viner 1950).  The formal 
arrangement of economic agreements also implies expectations about future interactions and 
policies.  States that sign agreements both signal the importance of their commercial relationship 
and the desire to see it develop further.  In other words, states seek economic agreements to lock-
in and enhance access to markets they view as important and critical for future development 
(Whalley 1996; Schiff and Winters 1998).  Given these factors, members likely identify their 
long-term economic interests with those of the agreement broadly and its constituent states.   
Economic agreements, however, foster this regional interdependence at the expense of 
interdependence with the rest of the world.  The implication of the increased salience of ties 
between agreement members is a corresponding decrease in salience with other trade blocs.  
Shifting sources of imports and markets for export from non-members to members necessarily 
decreases the relative importance of those ties.  Alternatively stated, agreement members tend to 
rely on partner states for greater portions of their trade portfolio.  Members therefore rely on 
other trade blocs less for commercial viability and overall trade.  Furthermore, material exchange 
does not necessarily have to decrease between members and non-members of agreements 
provided expectations of greater exchange or policy stability are generated.  The more states look 
to the agreement for future commercial relations the less important become other agreements.  
This is particularly true to the extent economic agreements encourage protectionist policies.  
Economic agreements that raise barriers to trade both reduce the material exchange between 
trade blocs and signal intentions of future policies and goals.  The marginalization of inter-
agreement ties is also compounded if trade diversion occurs.   Agreements that draw trade 
internally at the expense of external parties or other trade blocs further reduce the importance of 
inter-agreement linkages.  Trade diverting agreements, furthermore, have incentive to further 
marginalize the world and stymie interdependence (Winters 1996; Olarreaga and Soloaga 1998).   
In turn, the marginalization of economic ties between economic agreement members and 
non-members influences conflict behavior by reducing its opportunity cost.  One of the important 
reasons interdependence reduces conflict is the forgone benefits states incur by engaging in 
combat (Polachek, 1980; Doyle 1997).  By diversifying trade partners, or even emphasizing 
certain ties over others, states necessarily decrease dependence on any one source.  Martin, 
Mayer, and Thoenig (2008) argue that decreases in systemic trade costs, part of which is 
associated with barriers, reduce the multilateral impact of bilateral conflict.  That is, lower 
systemic trade costs allow states to shift trade to other nations thus reducing the negative 
externalities of conflict.  Consequently, as economic agreements reduce trade costs for members, 
the ability of members to leverage intra-agreement ties in potentially absorbing excess trade 
affected by hostilities with non-members reduces the overall cost of those conflicts.  In a way, 
economic agreements create trade sanctuaries the partially insulate their members of the negative 
effects of conflict with states in other trade agreements.  Having a place in a ready-made, 
codified trade network reduces the ill-effects of trade disruptions with non-agreement members.  
Given the overall marginalization of ties between agreement members and non-members, the 
deterrence influence of conflict is restricted.  Hence, just as self-reliant states likely suffer less 
from conflict and therefore employ it more frequently (Maoz 2006), we might expect more self-
reliant trade blocs to experience more conflict through similar mechanisms.  The notion that 
trade deters conflict is also in part based on a long-term expectation future trade relations will be 
hurt by war (Barbieri and Levy 1999).  By erecting an implicit barrier between members and 
non-members, economic agreements marginalize the future utility of trading relationships in 
ways that similarly impede their deterrent effect.   
Agreement Centrality and Conflict Propensities        
 The extent to which economic agreements affect the interdependence of member states 
with the external world is not uniform across trade blocs, however.  Economic agreements are 
comprised of different trade partners and possess unique attributes that profoundly affect their 
aggregate impact on member-state behavior.  As the economic literature indicates, larger trade 
blocs are expected to act differently vis-à-vis the external world than smaller ones.  In many 
ways this is a direct function of their realized or potential economic leverage.  Consequently, as I 
will argue, trade blocs that occupy a central location in the global trade network are more self-
reliant and autonomous.  As a consequence, central agreements are likely more conflict prone. 
 Economic agreements, in reality, are a highly heterogeneous lot in terms of state 
composition, issue coverage, and overall objective and goals.  Trade blocs tend to divide 
regionally based simply on the tendency for major trade partners to be spatially clustered and the 
political feasibility of penning agreements with familiar states.  The geographic clustering of 
agreements can result in either a highly homogenous set of states (such as most African 
agreements) or a hub-and-spoke style of organization where one state is clearly the dominant 
trade partner (like the Commonwealth of Independent States around Russia or the South African 
Customs Union around South Africa).  Likewise, issue coverage is quite diverse.  While all 
agreements address trade to some extent, some go further to include the creation of common 
external tariffs or the free movement of labor and capital.  Agreement objectives are often 
multifaceted and complex.  At the most basic level, all agreements want to increase trade 
between members.  That said, the reason for doing so is often different.  Several early South 
American agreements sought the creation of self-sufficient areas through import substitution 
programs.  Others, like the early incarnations of the European integration, sought internal 
security through interdependence.   
 Heterogeneity between economic agreements in these capacities results in a varied set of 
unique characteristics.  Some trade blocs are comprised of very important states in the global 
trading system linked together for political and economic reasons.  Other blocs contain smaller, 
more marginalized states motivated by the implicitly larger market created by economic 
agreements.  Following from this heterogeneity, the economic leverage of a trade bloc as a whole 
is derived both from the attributes of its constituent states and their position within the global 
trade network.  In turn, the degree to which an economic agreement fosters an enclave of 
interdependence is in part a reflection of these attributes.   
 Consider first highly central economic agreements comprised of states at the core of the 
global trade network.  Central trade blocs possess states that trade with a majority of the world 
and have extensive intra-agreement ties.  These characteristics afford them substantial leverage 
in two distinct ways.  First, highly central agreements sit in coveted positions of the trade 
network where market access can be wielded as power (explicitly or implicitly).  Trade blocs 
implicitly cordons off the external world if only by defining the limits of member-states’ 
economic openness (Baldwin 1993).  Furthermore, the creation of an economic agreement 
creates a relatively larger market for potential firms looking to invest or trade (Joumotte 2004).  
Access to a central agreement gains states and their constituent businesses entrée to highly 
connected, relatively large trading states.  As a consequence, states excluded from the central 
agreement likely desire access to the central agreement’s markets.  This is evidenced in part by 
the zeal with which many states have courted “Fortress Europe” and the creation of the Central 
American Free Trade Agreement in the wake its North American counterpart.  Second, central 
agreements are better able to utilize economic power in conflict.  On one hand, as argued, 
agreements afford member sanctuaries from the ill-effects of conflict.  The ill-effects of conflict 
are mitigated to the extent states can leverage their trade bloc to divert forgone trade.  On the 
other hand, central agreements can actively wield economic power by controlling market access.  
Central trade blocs, by virtue of their relatively large, highly desirable markets, can coordination 
sanctions effectively to compel policy change in target states.  Indeed, several trade blocs have 
pursued coordinated action against non-member states, including the European Union and 
Economic Community of West African States (Blunt 2005; European Union 2008).   
Consider now marginalized trade agreements that are less central to the global trading 
system.  First, market access to less central agreements is relatively less desirable than for central 
agreements.  Their position on the fringe of the global trade network is less valuable or sought 
after by other states or areas.  Losing access to a marginalized agreement, in other words, is less 
likely to significantly impact other states or agreements.  Furthermore, marginalized agreements 
are more likely to depend on the core of the global trading system.  On one hand, more 
peripheral trade blocs are more likely to depend on access to a few, highly central states for 
export markets.  On the other, even if this is not the case, states in marginalized agreements 
likely desire access to more central agreements in order to bolster or diversify their trade 
network.  Consequently, marginalized agreements are less salient than central ones in the global 
trading system.  Furthermore, less central agreements possess less economic leverage with which 
to coerce other states.  Their smaller trade network indicates, first, they have fewer ties from 
which to leverage economic power and, second, possess less maximal force when coercing.   
 The dichotomy between central and marginalized trade agreements suggests important 
differences in conflict behavior when paired dyadically.  Central agreements benefit from 
possessing desired positions in the trade network and high economic leverage.  When two central 
trade blocs square off, however, these characteristics are limited or mitigated.  First, because 
both agreements possess highly salient trade networks from their bloc, we might expect both to 
be insulated from the cost of conflict to some degree.  Furthermore, while central agreements 
likely still desire access to other central agreements, it is not as imperative as for less central 
agreements.  Highly central trade blocs that contain salient states are robust trade are less 
interdependent with other blocs or areas of the world as a result.  Consequently, as the cost of 
conflict is less on both sides of the conflict, the use of force is more likely to occur.  Second, for 
many of the same reasons, economic coercion that is enabled by highly central trade agreements 
is less effective against other central agreements.  Central agreements are less interdependent 
with the rest of the world, and as a consequence are less affected by the imposition of sanctions 
or their long-term effects.  The reduced effectiveness of economic coercion between highly 
central agreements decreases the likelihood they are employed.  As a result, military force may 
be the only viable option with which members of central agreements may coerce members of 
opposing trade blocs.  For this reasons, we might expect relations between highly central 
economic agreements to be more conflict prone than with less central agreements:  
H1: Highly central agreements are more likely to engage in conflict with other highly central 
agreements than less central ones. 
 Relations between highly central and marginalized states, in contrast, are likely less 
conflict prone.  First, marginalized agreements are still dependent to some extent on central trade 
blocs.  They either depend on markets in certain central areas or aspire to preferential access.  
Conflict against central trade blocs for marginalized trade blocs, therefore, can be costly in the 
short- and long-run.  Second, economic coercion is more effective against marginalized trade 
blocs.  Less central trade blocs possess fewer alternatives to shift trade lost by sanctions because 
their intra-agreement trade networks are less developed and market access to central agreements 
is proportionally more salient.  Economic sanctions are therefore more effective when central 
trade blocs target marginalized ones by virtue of the latter’s lack of options (Hirschman 1981).  
Consequently, when marginalized agreements are confronted by more central ones, they likely 
capitulate either without coercion or once economic force is applied.  The result of dynamics 
between central and marginalized trade blocs leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: Less central agreements are less likely to engage in conflict with highly central agreements 
than equally central ones. 
Conceptualization and Operationalization        
To empirically test my theory that economic agreements influence conflict between trade 
blocs, I use a large-N statistical analysis of economic agreements from 1950 to 2001.  I structure 
the dataset dyadically such that my unit of analysis is agreement dyad-years.  My dependent 
variable is the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute between two different economic 
agreements.  I code this variable 1 if dispute occurs between agreements in a given year and 0 
otherwise.
2
  I obtain data for this variable from the Maoz dyadic MID dataset (Maoz 2005).   
My theory hinges on the centrality and salience of economic agreements.  I specify two 
primary explanatory variables to address these characteristics of agreements.  First, the centrality 
of an economic agreement refers directly to its position within the global trading system.  More 
central states and agreements, I argue, command greater weight and wield more influence than 
less central ones.  As this is network data, I employ a standard measure used in network analysis 
studies to reflect the centrality or importance of a state within the global trading network.  
Specifically, I capture the economic agreement centrality through the use of averaged 
eigenvector centrality scores of its constituent states.  I consider two states to be connected if 
they trade during a given year.  Ties are constructed using trade data from Barbieri, Keshk, and 
Pollins (2008).   
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 Approximately 10% of agreement dyads that experience MIDs experience multiple MIDs in a given year.  While 
dichotomization discards these multiple MIDs, the relative infrequency of multiple occurrences limits the inferential 
impact of doing so.  I also conducted analysis using a zero-inflated binomial count model.  The results were not 
substantially different from the logit models reported in this paper. 
Eigenvector centrality builds off simple degree centrality, which measures only the 
proportion a node’s extant ties over all possible ties, by incorporating the centrality of all other 
nodes connected to one particular node.  Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality is: 
xAx   
Where A  is an adjacency matrix (where 1 indicates two nodes are connected), x is a 
centrality vector and   is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues that maximize the equation 
(Bonacich and Lloyd, 2001).  Eigenvector centrality therefore accounts not only for how 
connected a particular state is, but also how connected are its trade partners.  Intuitively, a state 
that trades with dozens of peripheral states might not be as economically central as a state that 
trades with only a handful of the most central states in the system.  While the former has 
influence with several other states with whom it trades, that influence does not go very far due to 
the trade partners relatively limited connections. The latter, on the other hand, although it only 
has ties with a few other states, each of those states has a great deal of influence internationally 
due to their extensive connections. In other words, a state’s centrality is proportional to the 
weighted sum of the states to which it is connected.
 
  I use the Maoz Social Network Program 
developed by Zeev Maoz’ to derive eigenvector centrality scores for each state-year.  I then 
average the scores of member states to arrive at an aggregated, agreement-level variable.
3
   
My second primary explanatory variable addresses the aggregate economic weight of an 
agreement.  The economic influence an agreement possesses is in part a reflection of how much 
trade it conducts.  That is, agreements that foster relatively substantial amounts of trade are more 
influential than agreements that do not cover large areas of trade.  To operationalize this, I 
calculate the total trade (imports + exports) occurring between states in an agreement per year 
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 I conducted robustness tests by including the standard deviation of centrality scores (and interactions with average 
centrality) in each statistical model to account for the cohesion of agreements themselves.  The results did not 
deviate significant from those reported here.  
using the aforementioned trade data from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2008).  Total trade is then 
divided by the sum on agreement members’ GDP to arrive at a normalized measure.  I use GDP 
data from Gleditsch (2002). 
Both the centrality and intra-agreement trade measures are then treated differently in two 
separate empirical models.  The first model uses the weak-link assumption by including only the 
lowest values eigenvector centrality and intra-agreement trade in the dyad.  My expectation is 
that these variables will positively correlate with the initiation of MIDs.  This approach allows 
inference into whether highly central and/or salient agreement dyads engage in conflict.  It does 
not, however, capture the relative positions of agreements completely, thereby rendering it ill-
suited for hypothesis 2.  I thus include a second model that uses the ratio of eigenvector 
centrality scores and intra-agreement trade (which is not normalized on GDP) within the 
agreement dyad by dividing the lowest value over the highest.  The resulting measure is bound 
between zero and one with higher scores indicating more symmetry between agreements.  This 
allows a more direct analysis of hypothesis 2 regarding the relationship between agreements of 
different status.  I also expect the ratio measures will be positively correlated with MID onset. 
I also use a number of control variables to account for competing explanations of conflict 
between trade blocs.  Many of these variables are aggregations of dyadic measures seen in the 
prevailing conflict literature.  First, I control for the relative capabilities of trade blocs using 
composite index of national capabilities (CINC) scores from the Correlates of War dataset.  The 
measure is calculated as the sum of capabilities across members for each agreement, then made 
relational by dividing the smaller by the larger figure.  I obtain data from the Correlates of War 
(Gibler and Sarkees 2004; Singer 1987).  Second, in accordance with the democratic peace 
literature, I control for regime type with average democracy scores for members in an agreement 
using data from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2007).  I only include the 
lowest democracy score in the agreement dyad in according with the weak-link assumption.   
Third, industrialization or absolute economic size may also influence conflict between 
agreements, as economically large areas more readily possess the means to wage war.  
Consequently, I control for the overall economic power of agreements using the sum of 
members’ GDP.  Only the lowest GDP score is included in my analysis.  Fourth, as my theory 
addresses directly economic interdependence between agreement areas, I include a traditional 
variable for interdependence measured as the sum of bilateral trade between members of two 
separate agreements as a share of summed GDP.  The lowest score is included in the statistical 
model to reflect the degree of dyadic agreement interdependence.  Fifth, my theory specifically 
references the accessibility of economic agreements as an influence on conflict.  To account for 
this, I include a variable for total agreement external openness measured as the sum of members’ 
total national trade (less intra-agreement trade) as a share of summed GDP.  The resulting 
measure captures the extent to which external parties can freely trade with the agreement area.  
Finally, because agreements are not symmetric, I include a count of the number of states in a 
dyad.  This accounts for the logical notion that agreements with more states are more likely to 
engage in conflict by virtue of greater opportunities for conflict.   
Estimation and Results           
After account for missing data, my analysis includes approximately 16,000 agreement 
dyads.  MIDs and sanctions occur in less than 3% of observations.  Because my dependent 
variable is dichotomous, I use logistic regression with robust standard errors for statistical 
analysis.
4
  I also lag all independent variables one year to help control for endogeneity and 
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 Given the relative rarity with which disputes occur (less than 3% of cases), I use rare events logistic regression 
developed by King, Tomz, and Zeng (1999) as a robustness check.  The results are identical to those reported here.  
protect the temporal integrity of the analysis.  Finally, I include a cubic polynomial variable 
capturing the number of years between militarized disputes between agreement dyads to address 
potential dependencies between conflict events (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Carter and 
Signiorino 2010).   
---- Table 1 Approximately Here ---- 
Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for all variables in my analysis.  Focusing on the 
primary independent variables, the weak-link centrality has a mean of 9.113 with a fairly tight 
standard deviation.  At the extreme end, however, the most central  states easily double the mean 
score.  Relative centrality is also normally distributed with a mean of approximately 0.75.  The 
intra-agreement trade variables reveal some interesting patterns.  First, looking at the weak-link 
variable that measures intra-agreement trade as a share of agreement GDP, it appears some 
agreements fail to generate meaningful intra-agreement trade.  Indeed, the average of all 
agreements is approximately 0.2% of GDP, although some cover as much as 10% of agreement 
GDP.  The ratio of intra-agreement trade, furthermore, is right skewed with a mean of 0.226.  
Asymmetry between agreements is therefore manifest mostly in the trade they engender. 
---- Table 2 Approximately Here ---- 
Table 2 contains the results of the logit estimations for both models.  Consider first the 
weak-link model capturing centrality as the lowest score in the dyad.  The centrality variable is 
positive and significant, indicating that more central agreements are more likely to initiate MIDS 
against relatively more central agreements.  This suggests that the more central an agreement is, 
the less interdependent it is with other agreement areas and regions.  As a result, the cost of 
conflict is lower for central agreements.  As a result, when two central agreements experience 
conflict, the probability of it militarizing increases.  Intra-agreement trade, however, fails to 
achieve statistical significance at conventional levels.  Consequently, it does not appear that the 
aggregate size of the agreements factors meaningfully into their conflict behavior. 
Turning to the relative centrality and intra-agreement trade model, we see similar results.  
The relative centrality variable is positive and significant, indicating that the more symmetric 
agreements are, the more likely they are to engage in conflict.  By implication, asymmetric 
agreement relations are less likely to result in militarized conflict.  This lends support to my 
argument that the most conflict-prone inter-agreement relations are those between central trade 
blocs.  Disputes between one highly central and one marginalized agreement are likely to result 
in the capitulation of the latter prior to or with limited coercion.  In contrast, when two central 
agreements conflict, it is more likely both trade blocs prefer militarized conflict to acquiescence.  
This would also seem to indicate, consistent with my theory, that less central agreements are 
more likely to fight their peers than central agreements.  As with the weak-link model, however, 
the intra-agreement trade ratio variable fails to achieve statistical significance.   
Two different substantive interpretations are offered in this paper.  First, the last column 
of Table 2 includes the change in the predicted probability of observing a MID when the variable 
of interest moves from the first to third quartile.  A shift from the first quartile of agreement 
centrality using the weak-link assumption to the third quartile – from roughly the South 
American Customs Union to the Arab Common Market – increases the probability of a MID by 
17.1%.  This effect is not insignificance, as it approximately doubles the effect of GDP on 
conflict probability.  Likewise, a shift from the first to third quartile of relative agreement 
centrality increases the probability of conflict by 23.1%.  This is equivalent to the shift between 
the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (which centers on Russia) relations with Central 
European Free Trade Association (which includes many former Soviet Satellites) on one hand 
and the European Free Trade Area (including non-EU European states) on the other.  Once 
again, this effect is not insignificant compared to other variables, as it outweighs the substantive 
effect of both GDP and openness.   
---- Figures 1 and 2 Approximately Here ---- 
The second means of interpretation is contained in Figures 1 and 2, which plot the 
predicted probabilities of conflict against agreement centrality in both models.  Looking at 
Figure 1 first, which reflects the weak-link model, the probability of a MID increases in tandem 
with agreement centrality until a value of approximately 15.  At this point, the effect plateaus 
before a decline.  Rather than a non-linear affect, this likely reflects the paucity of observations 
at the tail of the graph.
5
  It is also important to note that the confidence intervals of the graphs do 
not contain zero at any point, indicating the substantive impact of centrality is meaningful across 
the full range of possible values.  Figure 2, which plots the relative centrality measure, indicates 
the same basic trend.  More symmetric trade agreement centrality increases the probability of 
militarized conflict.  This effect, furthermore, is significant across the range of possible values.   
Turning briefly to the other variables in my analysis, some interesting results emerge.  
First, agreements of relatively equal capabilities are more likely to engage in conflict.  This 
makes intuitive sense, as agreements of similar size are more likely to “like their odds” in 
combat.  Second, consistent with the democratic peace literature, the more democratic the 
agreement dyad, the less likely it is to engage in military conflict.  Third, higher values of trade 
between agreement areas actually increase the probability of conflict.  This may reflect the 
severing of interdependence between agreement areas such that even bilateral links fail to 
prevent conflict.  Fourth, the more developed the agreements, the more likely they are to 
experience military force, likely resulting from their ability to wage war.  Fifth, as might be 
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 A polynomial term was tested in the model, but did not achieve significance. 
expected, dyads with more members are more likely to experience conflict owing to the increase 
opportunity to do so.  Finally, openness only achieves significance in the relative centrality 
model.  Its coefficient is negative, indicating that more open agreements are less likely to 
experience conflict.  This comports with my notion that agreements maintaining interdependence 
with other areas are less likely to see conflict as a viable option.   
Overall, the results of my statistical analysis support the two hypotheses presented.  
Dyads comprised of highly central agreements are more likely to experience militarized conflict 
by virtue of the positive and significant coefficients in both the weak-link and relative centrality 
models.  This suggests that highly central trade blocs are insulated in part from the ill-effects of 
conflict, and therefore are more apt to use it in disputes.  Likewise, marginalized agreements are 
less likely to conflict with central ones given the positive and significant coefficient on the 
relative centrality measure.  Less central agreements are more likely to capitulate to central ones 
in disputes, as they are more dependent on access to large markets for future economic success.  
Hence, agreements of roughly equal centrality are the most conflict prone.  As a result of these 
findings, I find support for both hypotheses 1 and 2.   
Estimation and Results           
At the outset of this paper, I ask whether the proliferation of economic agreements 
influenced interstate conflict in meaningful ways.  The answer to this question appears to be 
“yes,” as more central economic agreements tend to experience more tension than other types of 
trade blocs.  As highly central, salient states form trade agreements, they foster enclaves of 
regional interdependence at the expensive of more systemic, multilateral interdependence.  The 
result is a generally lower cost of conflict for central agreements given their development of 
trade sanctuaries through economic agreements.  When facing each other, consequently, two 
central trade blocs are more likely to see military force as a viable policy option.  Marginalized 
agreements, however, are still dependent on access to central areas.  In turn, when facing a 
dispute with central agreements, they capitulate with little or no coercion applied.   
Overall, the results from my empirical analysis suggest a number of interesting 
conclusions and important implications.  First, in line with one particular segment of economics 
literature, the impact of regional trade agreements appears to be more divisive than unifying.  
While this paper does not indicate what a world without economic agreements looks like, it does 
suggest that the proliferation of agreements has not pacified relations between the most central 
agreements.  Second, my results also have interesting implications for the liberal peace.  In many 
ways my theory and analysis supports the important pacifying forces behind arguments of 
interdependence and conflict.  Exclusion from economic agreements, I argue, reduces 
interdependence and the salience of trade ties.  Consequently, integration severs the mechanisms 
by which the liberal peace operates between agreement areas.  The core of liberalism is clearly 
intact and, indeed, is augmented by my analysis.  What I do, however, is refine the conditions 
under which economic liberalism may succeed in preventing conflict between states.  Economic 
integration may create security externalities for states if they significantly reduce the importance 
of external ties.  Consequently, if my work criticizes the liberal peace, it is only by stating that 
the structure of trade relationships mattes for conflict in certain situations.  Hence, not all trade 
openness can be expected to purchase a state security.  Indeed, those states that seek economic 
integration as part of a security plan aimed at excluded states are likely to exacerbate conflict and 
strategic rivalry. 
Overall, my analysis has two major contributions for scholarship and policy.  First, it 
contributes to the growing body of literature exploring the effects of economic integration on 
interstate conflict.  While integration may pacify internal relations, as previous literature 
suggests, it may involve a tradeoff vis-à-vis external security.  Second, in a related manner, my 
analysis addresses a generally neglected area of international relations.  Specifically, how might 
the existence and operation of finite international institutions influence states excluded from 
membership?  State decisions to seek integration are strategic choices that necessarily exclude 
certain parties.  It follows, therefore, that institutions may have as profound consequences for 
non-members as they do members.  I provide one piece of what might be a dynamic and 
interested research program.     
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
     
Dependent Variable 
    
0 
(None) 
1 
(Initiated) 
MIDs 
Frequency 15,934  331  
Percentage 97.96% 2.04% 
Independent Variables 
    Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Centrality 9.113 2.214 3.729 8.688 20.805 
Intra-Agreement Trade 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.096 
Relative Centrality 0.751 0.162 0.187 0.767 1.000 
Relative Intra-agreement 
Trade 0.226 0.260 0.000 0.116 1.000 
Capabilities 0.269 0.278 <0.001 0.152 0.999 
Democracy -0.817 5.588 -9.667 -1.200 10.000 
Openness 0.144 0.088 0.000 0.131 0.734 
Bilateral Trade 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.001 0.260 
GDP ($ billions) 247.000 514.000 1.120 54.500 9,320.000 
Total Members 10.659 7.240 2.000 9.000 45.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 2: Agreement Centrality and Interstate Conflict 
Lowest Agreement Centrality and Trade 
  Coefficient Standard Error 
Change in MID Probability 
(First to Third Quartile) 
CentralityLow                    0.069* 0.030 17.1% 
Intra-agreement TradeLow          -10.17                       10.922 ----- 
Capabilities                 0.930*** 0.203 35.2% 
DemocracyLow                -0.052*** 0.012    -52.1% 
OpennessLow          -1.274 0.686 ----- 
Bilateral TradeLow            8.627* 3.444   0.8% 
GDPLow                0.001*** 0.000   8.4% 
Total Members                0.059*** 0.006 60.4% 
Constant                -4.613*** 0.325 ----- 
N        16,264     
Pseudo-R
2
        0.1152 
 
  
Log pseudolikelihood       1430.41 
 
  
  
  
  
Relative Agreement Centrality and Trade 
  Coefficient         Standard Error 
Change in MID Probability 
(First to Third Quartile) 
Relative Centrality            0.924* 0.401 23.1% 
Relative Intra-agreement Trade         -0.379 0.239 ----- 
Capabilities                0.794*** 0.203 30.0% 
DemocracyLow               -0.049*** 0.012    -48.8% 
OpennessLow           -1.503* 0.703    -16.0% 
Bilateral TradeLow              9.869** 3.630   0.9% 
GDPLow                0.001*** 0.000   8.6% 
Total Members                0.058*** 0.006 63.6% 
Constant                -4.585*** 0.360      ----- 
N       16,190     
Pseudo-R
2
       0.1153 
 
  
Log pseudolikelihood     -1398.01     
Dependent variable refers to the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute (MID); Estimates produced using logit and verified with 
rare-events logit; Robust standard errors in parentheses; Predicted probabilities calculated by holding all variables at thier mean 
values while manipulating the variable of interest.  * p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001 
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